

**THE HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET  
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN UZBEKISTAN AND ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE  
EARLY YEARS.**

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**Abstract.** *In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the political processes that took place within the system of state governance in Russia were also reflected in Turkestan as a colonial territory. Profound transformations based on communist ideological principles were implemented in the administration of the region. As in all other spheres and sectors, the judicial and prosecutorial systems were subjected to comprehensive reorganization. Drawing on available archival sources, this article examines the establishment of the Soviet Prosecutor's Office in the region, analyzes its activities during the initial years of its formation, and explores the nature of interactions between prosecutorial institutions and party organizations.*

**Keywords:** *Turkestan Region; Soviet Power; Administrative-Command System; Judiciary; Prosecutor's Office; Prosecutor; Indigenous Peoples; Communist Party; Legal Personnel; Investigator.*

Following the military coup carried out in Petrograd on 25 October 1917, the Bolsheviks, who seized control of the governance of the Russian state, from the very first days sought to expand their activities under extremely delicate and complex socio-political conditions. In order not to lose dominance in the face of the critical situation that had emerged and to resolve the unstable political processes unfolding in society in their own favor, the Bolsheviks took measures to make effective use of every opportunity that arose. In particular, the urgent establishment of judicial and legal institutions—considered a crucial component of state development and a fundamental pillar ensuring the balance between the state and society—was placed on the agenda of the ruling party as one of its primary tasks. Accordingly, the activities of existing institutions such as the courts, the prosecutor's office, investigative bodies, the legal profession, and the police (militia), which were responsible for conducting inquiries into various legal relations, providing legal assessments, and delivering judgments, were reorganized on the basis of revolutionary norms and regulations. The rapid formation of these institutional systems was aimed at preserving power seized through violence, consolidating the dictatorship established through coercion, and creating a

reliable protective framework for the future administrative-command system of governance. For this reason, in territories where Bolshevik rule was established, “revolutionary” courts, bodies of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), people’s militia units, and revolutionary tribunals were introduced within a short period, with the active participation of party supporters.

Despite its considerable distance from the political center, by the final months of 1917 the administration of the Turkestan Region also underwent revolutionary transformations modeled on central directives. In particular, the First Decree “On the Court,” publicly proclaimed on 24 November 1917 by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)<sup>60</sup> and aimed at abolishing the former judicial institutions, was announced throughout the region on 12 December 1917 by Special Order No. 17 of the Turkestan Council of People’s Commissars (Chairman F. Kolesov)<sup>61</sup>. This document, which was to be applied to regional life from 1 January 1918, was based on the centrally adopted Decree “On the Court.” However, the practical implementation of the provisions of this order and ensuring its enforcement in Turkestan proved to be one of the most difficult and complex tasks, given the specific characteristics of the region at that time. Although formal administrative control of the region had passed into the hands of the Bolsheviks, the influence and political activity of the new government were barely felt in areas distant from the major urban centers. More precisely, an ambiguous and largely incomprehensible situation emerged in the daily life of society, making it difficult for the majority of ordinary people to fully grasp the essence of the ongoing political transformations or to develop a clear and informed response to them.

The First Decree “On the Court” abolished the courts that had functioned under the former tsarist administration and mandated their complete reorganization, while simultaneously terminating the activities of the prosecutor’s office and the legal profession. Clause 3 of the First Decree explicitly stated that “all previously existing institutions of courts, investigations, and prosecutorial oversight shall be abolished,”<sup>62</sup> and provided subsequent instructions on the establishment of new courts; however, it did not mention the prosecutor or define the scope of their responsibilities. This decision by the Bolshevik government created an inherently unnatural situation in judicial practice. Indeed, the prosecutorial system, which was responsible for supervising the proper application of laws, as well as the legal profession, which was supposed to safeguard the rights of the accused

<sup>60</sup> История Советской прокуратуры в важнейших документах. Москва. 1952 г. стр-56-59.

<sup>61</sup> ЎзР МДА Р 25-фонд, 1-рўйхат, 19-ийғмажилд, 32-варак, 32-варак орка.

<sup>62</sup> История Советской прокуратуры в важнейших документах. Москва. 1952. С-57.

and ensure their legal protection, were effectively eliminated. To address this deficiency, the Seventh Section of the Second Decree “On the Court,” adopted in March 1918, established a “Collegium of Legal Protectors” under the Council of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies<sup>63</sup>. Members of this collegium were authorized to participate in court proceedings either as prosecutors or defenders. The establishment and approval of the “Collegium of Legal Protectors,” which could perform prosecutorial and advocacy functions during judicial proceedings, were placed directly under the discretion of the local soviets. Subsequently, for a certain period, the exercise of prosecutorial powers—including supervising the application of laws and supporting the state’s prosecution in court—was carried out by various commissariats and local soviets. However, as this arrangement proved ineffective, it was not until the middle of 1921 that the Soviet authorities undertook the task of formally organizing prosecutorial activities. In order to restore the proper functioning of this institution, a draft statute regulating the work of the prosecutor’s office was developed.

The process of reestablishing prosecutorial institutions and implementing their activities in the Turkestan Region proceeded in a distinctive manner. In order to organize the work of the prosecutor’s offices, from August 1921 the regional People’s Commissariat of Justice began preparing the legal framework for a special body tasked with supervising legislation. Finally, at the 8th session of the Turkestan People’s Commissariat of Justice on 23 March 1922, the draft decree “On the State Prosecutor’s Office of the Turkestan Republic” was adopted, with some amendments<sup>64</sup>. The adopted draft statute was approved on 29 March 1922 at the plenary session of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Turkestan SSR<sup>65</sup> and was subsequently submitted to the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan for review and final ratification. On 9 May 1922, the statute was also ratified by the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan<sup>66</sup>. The “Statute on the State Prosecutor’s Office” of the Turkestan ASSR was adopted earlier than the Soviet state’s own prosecutor statute. This was because the “Statute on Prosecutorial Supervision,” which regulated the organization of prosecutorial activities, was not approved until 28 May 1922, during the III session of the IX convocation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, following the recommendation of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)<sup>67</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> История Советской прокуратуры в важнейших документах. Москва. 1952. С-72.

<sup>64</sup> ЎзР МДА Р 25-фонд, 1-рўйхат, 19а-йигмажилд, 64-варак.

<sup>65</sup> ЎзР МДА Р 25-фонд, 1-рўйхат, 19-йигмажилд, 61-варак.

<sup>66</sup> Ўзбекистон Республикаси прокуратураси. Адолат йўлида 70 йил. Муаллиф-тузувчилар Ф.Қ.Қиличев, В.Х.Лукмонов ва бошқ. Тошкент. 1992 йил. Б-28., Ф. Бакиров. СССРда суд ва прокуратура тузилиши. Тошкент. 1974. Б-90.

<sup>67</sup> История советской прокуратуры в важнейших документах. Москва. 1952. С-264.

However, the central authorities did not authorize the implementation of the statute due to certain provisions in the Turkestan ASSR statute that deviated from Leninist directives<sup>68</sup>, specifically regarding the impossibility of dual subordination of prosecutorial bodies, as well as other identified errors and deficiencies. Certainly, these actions reflected the center's dismissive attitude toward a remote and peripheral region, as well as its intention to maintain strict control over governance in colonial territories.

Subsequently, based on the provisions of the "Statute on Prosecutorial Supervision" adopted by the central authorities on 28 May 1922, practical measures were initiated to reopen prosecutorial institutions throughout the country. According to the adopted statute, the prosecutor's office was to be organized within the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR, while in the union republics the People's Commissar of Justice was to serve directly as the republican prosecutor. The statute stipulated that regional prosecutors were to be appointed, dismissed, and assigned to their posts by the republican prosecutor. Assistants to the regional prosecutors were to be approved by the republican prosecutor based on the recommendation of the regional prosecutor. In accordance with the overall content of the statute, prosecutorial bodies were required to perform the following functions:

- to lodge protests against decisions that contradicted the law issued by all People's Commissariats, local government bodies, organizations, public and private enterprises, and, in cases of criminal offenses, to initiate criminal proceedings and conduct investigations;

- to supervise the legality of investigative and prosecutorial activities conducted by the organs of the State Political Directorate (GPU) in opening criminal cases;

- to support the state prosecution in court;

- to monitor the lawful detention of prisoners in penal institutions.

Based on the statute adopted by the central authorities, on 31 October 1922 the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Republic approved the "Statute on the State Prosecutor's Office"<sup>69</sup>." This document was subsequently used as the legal foundation for the introduction of prosecutorial supervision in various parts of the region and for the organization of the activities of the prosecutorial bodies.

The prosecutor's offices of the Turkestan region carried out their official duties under the strict control and requirements of the central authorities in accordance with colonial rules. In organizing their activities, the prosecutor's offices were compelled to operate on the basis of party directives, orders, and instructions. In the early 1930s, following a report by the

<sup>68</sup> Қосимов В. Совет прокуратураси – адолат посбони. Тошкент. 1971. Б-13.

<sup>69</sup> Ўзбекистон Республикаси прокуратураси. Адолат йўлида 70 йил. Муаллиф-тузувчилар Ф.Қ.Киличев, В.Х.Лукмонов ва бошк. Тошкент., 1992 йил. Б-28.

Prosecutor of the Republic on the overall activities of the prosecutor's offices, the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR adopted Resolution No. 127 on March 22, 1932. The resolution identified a number of major shortcomings in the work of the prosecutor's offices, including the failure to take timely measures in implementing state economic and political campaigns, particularly in fulfilling directives related to cotton procurement; weaknesses in the struggle against the "kulaks"; the failure to fully ensure revolutionary legality; the creation of conditions for numerous unauthorized and unlawful arrests; the weakening of oversight over the local bodies of the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU); and the lack of effective and оператив leadership by the republican prosecutor's office over subordinate prosecutor's offices in the regions<sup>70</sup>. This document also addressed deficiencies directly attributable to the prosecutor's offices themselves. During those years, the appointment of only one prosecutor to two districts, the shortage of personnel in the prosecutor's and investigative bodies, frequent staff turnover, the presence of many unvetted and случай individuals within the prosecutorial and investigative institutions, as well as the unlawful interference of local government authorities in the оператив activities of the prosecutor's offices were identified as the main problems.

In this institution, attitudes toward local personnel and approaches to the "nationalization" of the prosecutor's offices followed an entirely different course. The consequences of such chauvinistic policies, which had been implemented since the establishment of the prosecutorial bodies in the Turkestan region, failed to bring about positive changes in the situation in subsequent years. By 1935, the national composition of prosecutors within the central apparatus of the republican prosecutor's office consisted of "3 Uzbeks, 1 Jew, 14 Europeans, and 2 representatives<sup>71</sup> of other nationalities." In other words, representatives of local nationalities accounted for only 20 percent<sup>72</sup> of the staff working in the central apparatus. The national composition of personnel working in the prosecutorial bodies remained unsatisfactory, and the interests of the local population were not adequately represented. In this regard, the leadership of the colonial government deliberately failed to pay serious attention to introducing changes over a number of years. It should, however, be noted that in the prosecutorial offices operating in the remote regions of the territory, the national composition of staff was more favorable compared to that of the central apparatus. In particular, representatives of local nationalities accounted for 66.3 percent of employees in 1935, 73 percent in 1936, and 60.7 percent in 1937<sup>73</sup>. During these years, as in other

<sup>70</sup> ЎзР МДА 837-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 1070-ийғмажилд, 61-62-вараклар.

<sup>71</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 65-ийғмажилд, 5-варак.

<sup>72</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 65-ийғмажилд, 6-варак.

<sup>73</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 69-ийғмажилд, 79-варак.

sectors, party requirements and criteria took precedence in the selection of personnel for the prosecutorial bodies. Little attention was paid to whether employees possessed sufficient professional qualifications and expertise, while primary emphasis was placed on their social origin and party affiliation. The social background and ideological alignment of prosecutorial staff remained under constant scrutiny by the Party. In 1935, out of 20 individuals working in the central apparatus of the republican prosecutor's office, 7 were workers, 5 were peasants, 2 were artisans (craftsmen), and 5 were representatives of the service class; of these, only <sup>74</sup> individuals were non-party members. The social origin and socio-political affiliation of personnel were placed under strict control and subjected to continuous scrutiny. Employees whose social backgrounds did not conform to the Party's political standards—those classified as "alien elements," "outsiders," "property owners," or "religious persons"—were subjected to constant persecution.

The judicial and prosecutorial system frequently experienced periodic political "purges" conducted by the Communist Party, high staff turnover, inadequate professional competence among employees, and the inappropriate appointment of personnel to positions for which they were unsuited. As a result, the issue of staffing the system with qualified specialists remained one of the most pressing and unresolved problems within the regional judicial and prosecutorial system.

Over the years, the failure to provide the prosecutor's offices with an adequate number of personnel became another major problem. According to sources, as of December 1935, there were <sup>75</sup> vacant prosecutorial positions within the republican prosecutorial bodies. As a consequence, in many cases random individuals were appointed to official positions, and persons lacking any professional experience or relevant skills entered the field.

Due to the haste in recruitment, the background of newly appointed individuals was not properly verified and their previous activities were not thoroughly examined. As a result, there were instances in which, "in a district not far from the center, a person who had spent twelve months in imprisonment in neighboring Kazakhstan was appointed to the position of prosecutor"<sup>76</sup>. This fact became known to the higher prosecutorial authorities only after some time had passed. Similar unqualified personnel committed serious mistakes in the performance of their official duties, which led to a decline in the authority and public reputation of the judicial and prosecutorial bodies. In an information report marked "Top Secret" and sent on May 29, 1936, to the Kashkadarya District Party Committee, it was

<sup>74</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 65-йиғмажилд, 5-варак.

<sup>75</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 65-йиғмажилд, 11-варак.

<sup>76</sup> ЎзР МДА 95-фонд, 7-рўйхат, 917-йиғмажилд, 113-варак.

stated that “on May 18 of the same year, the Koson District Prosecutor Juqunboyev and the People’s Judge of Precinct No. 150, Sarsonboyev, arrived at the ‘Muborak’ state farm to consider a criminal case, engaged in drinking alcohol, and organized a physical altercation in the residence of Jumayev, an operational officer of the district militia, during which they beat and drove away peasants<sup>77</sup> who had come there on official business.”

At a meeting held in one of the central republican bodies, the existing situation regarding disorder and serious deficiencies in the recruitment of personnel to the prosecutorial offices was acknowledged, stating that, “...we have such shortcomings; first we hire, and only afterwards do we conduct verification<sup>78</sup>. The improper selection of personnel, with insufficient attention paid to their qualifications and capabilities, became in most cases one of the main reasons why employees were unable to maintain stable tenure in a single position.

An even worse situation occurred in 1939 in the Ordzhonikidze (present-day Qibray) district, where over the course of a single year “the prosecutor and his assistant—12 prosecutors and an equal number of assistants—were replaced every month”<sup>79</sup>. The deterioration of the situation to this extent had a direct negative impact on the functioning of the judicial and prosecutorial system and contributed to further worsening of the existing conditions.

The issue of training legal specialists for the regional judicial and legal system remained unresolved in a positive sense for many years. During this period, the shortage of necessary specialists in the prosecutorial offices, as well as the insufficient professional knowledge and competence of the personnel in service, represented one of the most serious problems of the region. In particular, “out of 79 district prosecutors in Uzbekistan, 44 had lower-level education and 21 had secondary education. The majority of prosecutors in the republic had less than three years of professional experience in legal institutions<sup>80</sup>”. A similar situation was reflected in the central apparatus of the republican prosecutor’s office, where at the beginning of 1938, out of 21 personnel in service, 5 had higher education, 7 had secondary education, and 9 had lower-level education<sup>81</sup>. Of these, 12 individuals had legal education—5 with higher education, 4 with secondary education, and 3 with short-term

<sup>77</sup> Равшанов П. Қизил салтанат исканжасида. Қатагон. (Хужжатлардаги тарих). III-жилд. “Шарқ”. Тошкент. 2011. Б-140.

<sup>78</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-ийғмажилд, 271-варак.

<sup>79</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-ийғмажилд, 128-варак.

<sup>80</sup> Кудрявцев В.Н., Трусов А.И. Политическая юстиция в СССР. Санкт-Петербург. 2002. С-96.

<sup>81</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 65-ийғмажилд, 111-варак.

course training—while the remaining 9 employees, or nearly 43 percent<sup>82</sup>, had no legal education at all.

Overall, by 1940, 34 percent of personnel in the republican prosecutorial system<sup>83</sup> were working without any formal legal education. Even those who possessed documents certifying their qualifications sometimes failed to meet the basic competency requirements, yet they continued to serve within the system. In 1938, an employee sent by the republican prosecutor's office to work in Karakalpakstan had completed four years of higher education; however, in practice, he was unable to read or write in either Russian or Uzbek<sup>84</sup>. The issue of the shortage of qualified personnel in the system and the resulting problems was accurately assessed by the Prosecutor of Samarkand Province, Nazarenko, who stated, "The provincial apparatus is generally staffed with personnel; however, only a very small portion of them possess higher or secondary legal education. The others either completed short-term courses or have no retraining whatsoever"<sup>85</sup>. During this period, the overall situation in most judicial and prosecutorial offices was almost the same. Although the conditions in the prosecutorial offices of Tashkent Province, located closer to the republican center, were somewhat better than those in Samarkand Province, the Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Zakharov reported that, "Of the 83 personnel in the prosecutorial offices, 1 was a district prosecutor, 6 were deputy district prosecutors, and 8 were investigators with higher education; 7 were district prosecutors, 8 were prosecutor assistants, and 14 were investigators with secondary education<sup>86</sup>, while the remainder were semi-literate." Thus, nearly half of the personnel in service had no legal education and were performing their official duties with only secondary school qualifications.

During the period under consideration, the unlawful interference of local party organizations in the activities of the judicial and prosecutorial bodies increased. Instances of administrative authorities restricting the powers of personnel in the administration of justice and influencing them for party interests occurred frequently. In his report, the Prosecutor of the Republic identified "the obstruction of prosecutorial operations by local authorities and the increase in unlawful actions by local bodies"<sup>87</sup> as one of the most pressing problems. During his service, Azimov, who held the position of prosecutor of Precinct No. 45 in Chiroqchi District, found himself in a difficult situation and was compelled in 1931 to

<sup>82</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 65-йигмажилд, 112-варақ

<sup>83</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-йигмажилд, 267-варақ.

<sup>84</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-йигмажилд, 305-варақ орқа.

<sup>85</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-йигмажилд, 3-варақ.

<sup>86</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-йигмажилд, 45-варақ орқа.

<sup>87</sup> ЎзР МДА 837-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 1070-йигмажилд, 62-варақ.

submit a written appeal to the Prosecutor of the Republic, Smirnov. In his petition, he reported that Babajanov, the responsible secretary of the Yakkabag District Party Committee, despite having little familiarity with judicial procedures, had been issuing unlawful administrative orders such as “detain or release the accused”<sup>88</sup> without court rulings and was providing absolutely no conditions for proper work. For this reason, he requested to be sent to another region of the Republic for work or to attend retraining courses. These sources clearly show that the responsible officials of local party committees openly sought to directly influence prosecutorial work, further consolidate party control over members of society, and resolve situations at their own discretion, bypassing legislative norms without any obstacles.

Interference by the Communist Party in the activities of judicial and prosecutorial bodies and attempts to exert political pressure on their official powers became a routine occurrence. On February 27, 1935, Nadeev, the Prosecutor of Behbudi (Karshi) city, submitted an appeal to the leadership of the republican prosecutor's office, Kibardin and Sheindlin, regarding the attitude of the district party organization toward the prosecutorial institution. In his letter, he noted, “...relations between the district leadership and the prosecutor's office have sharply deteriorated. They are attempting to compromise the personnel of the prosecutor's office”<sup>89</sup>.

During this period, it became a common practice for personnel of judicial and prosecutorial bodies to resolve cases not in accordance with existing legislation or to issue legal rulings, but rather based on the demands of party organization representatives. By this time, the position of the party organization had become so powerful that it could easily dismiss a prosecutor or a judge. During 1940, approximately ten<sup>90</sup> prosecutors in Samarkand Province were removed from their positions by decisions of the party organizations.

By 1938, when the policy of mass repression had intensified, the situation had further deteriorated. As of January 1, only 70 percent of prosecutorial positions in the central apparatus and 60 percent<sup>91</sup> in the local bodies (regions, cities, and districts) were filled. The most severe situation was observed in the district prosecutor's offices, where, according to staffing allocations, 104 prosecutors were supposed to be in service, but only 57 district prosecutors were actively performing their duties, 27 were conditionally performing their responsibilities on a temporary basis, and in 20<sup>92</sup> districts there were no personnel serving as

<sup>88</sup> ЎзР МДА 904-фонд, 9-рўйхат, 64-ийғмажилд, 70-варак.

<sup>89</sup> Равшанов П. Қизил салтанат исканжасида. Қатағон. (Хужжатлардаги тарих). III-жилд. “Шарқ”. Тошкент. 2011. Б-120.

<sup>90</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 37-ийғмажилд, 272-варак орка.

<sup>91</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 69-ийғмажилд, 79-варак.

<sup>92</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 69-ийғмажилд, 79-варак, 65-ийғмажилд, 120-варак.

prosecutors at all. Among the prosecutors and assistants working in the system, 55 percent were Party members, 26 percent were candidates for membership, and 19 percent were members of the Komsomol organization, effectively transforming nearly the entire personnel into trusted representatives of the Party.

During the most terrible years of mass repression from 1937 to 1939, the activities of law enforcement personnel were also closely monitored from the perspective of Communist Party policy. Between January 1 and September 15, 1938 alone, 45 employees<sup>93</sup> from the prosecutorial and investigative bodies were dismissed for various reasons. Of these, 12 were dismissed<sup>94</sup> from their positions as “enemies of the people,” for “counter-revolutionary crimes,” or as participants in “counter-revolutionary activities,” and some were subjected to criminal prosecution.

During the peak years of mass repression, the prosecutorial bodies, which were supposed to oversee the correct and precise enforcement of existing laws, were compelled to reckon with the repressive organs of the authoritarian regime. In a meeting, Khosiyat Mominova, the Prosecutor of Tashkent District, stated: “Our relations with the GPU are becoming increasingly serious. Instances of people being detained without cause and held for indefinite periods have increased. If we attempt to raise this issue, we risk being imprisoned ourselves. We were even prohibited from setting foot in the detention facilities”<sup>95</sup>. These harsh words served as a painful assessment of an entire era, an entire system of state governance, and a regime based on party absolutism. Maintaining the population in submission through oppression, exercising arbitrary control over human destiny, and directly restricting individual freedoms became the fundamental essence of Soviet state administration.

The issue of the extremely low representation of women serving in the regional prosecutorial bodies remained unresolved for several years. Although certain efforts were made to achieve positive results in this area, they failed to produce the expected outcomes, and the problem persisted for a long period. For example, in the Samarkand Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, which was located farther from the republican center, historical sources record a troubling situation in 1939–1940: “Within the entire prosecutorial staff of the province, there were only four women; one worked in the provincial central apparatus, while three served in local offices, and among them there was not a single Uzbek woman”<sup>96</sup>.

<sup>93</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 69-йигмажилд, 103,104,105,106-варак.

<sup>94</sup> Ўша жойда

<sup>95</sup> Адолат йўлида 70 йил. Муаллиф тузувчилар. Ф.К. Киличев ва бошқалар. Тошкент.1992. Б-10.

<sup>96</sup> ЎзР МДА 1710-фонд, 10-рўйхат, 97-йигмажилд, 49-варак.

It is difficult to assess the activities of the regional prosecutorial bodies in the 1930s of the twentieth century as satisfactory or to positively acknowledge their efforts in establishing legality, which constituted the primary responsibility of the sector. As in all other spheres, the ruling Communist Party organized the functioning of the prosecutorial system according to its own ideological criteria. One of the main reasons for the inadequate organization of work within the system was the Party's persistent attempt to resolve issues through an administrative-command approach, forcibly imposed without taking local conditions into account. At the same time, the failure of essential orders and directives from the central apparatus to reach all regions in a timely manner, the backwardness of the material and technical base required for organizing institutional work, the absence of a stable and coordinated system of cooperation between higher and lower bodies, the extremely poor working conditions of employees, and a number of similar unresolved problems had a consistently negative impact on the functioning of the system. Most importantly, the acute shortage of qualified specialists possessing sufficient knowledge and practical experience, along with the persistent demand for skilled personnel, led to the continual stagnation of prosecutorial activities. Although various educational institutions for training legal professionals existed in the region, graduates of these institutions were not fully integrated into employment for a variety of reasons. Such a manner of organizing work within the system further complicated the activities of the prosecutorial bodies, resulted in the incomplete fulfillment of assigned tasks, and ultimately prevented the sector from achieving its stated objectives.

The Communist Party prioritized its own interests above all else in shaping the composition of personnel within the regional prosecutorial bodies. Its misguided policy in selecting cadres from among representatives of local nationalities had a negative impact on the development of the system. As a result, violations of existing laws during the performance of official duties and the inability of personnel to adequately assess situations became frequent occurrences. The continuous and systematic politicization of the prosecutorial system produced severe consequences and led to the emergence of numerous complex problems.

**Conclusion.** In the initial years following the establishment of Soviet power, the imposition of restrictions on the activities of personnel possessing legal knowledge and professional qualifications caused a serious disruption in the stable development of the regional prosecutorial system, as was the case throughout the state as a whole. This process, in turn, led to the emergence of a socio-political vacuum within the activities of the prosecutorial bodies, which constituted an integral part of the judicial system, and more broadly within the judicial-legal system itself—one of the fundamental functions of state

governance. The prosecutorial bodies, reorganized on the basis of Communist Party directives, were not provided in a timely manner with an adequate methodological and material base. Consequently, the inability of personnel to effectively fulfill their direct responsibilities—namely, ensuring the supremacy of law and exercising general oversight over its implementation within state governance—became increasingly evident. Such a complex situation inevitably had a negative impact on the overall functioning of the prosecutorial system. During the period under review, the conditions of personnel working within the prosecutorial bodies reorganized according to communist models at the regional level, as well as their professional education and practical experience, failed to fully meet the demands of judicial and legal practice. In the formation of personnel within the system, priority was given not to legal knowledge or professional experience, but rather to qualities such as social origin, class affiliation, and membership in the Party or the Komsomol, in accordance with the wishes and interests of the ruling party. As a result, during this period, individuals working within the prosecutorial system could continue to operate within judicial and legal institutions and defend the Party's administrative demands even in the absence of legal education, provided that their social background conformed to Party criteria. The level of legal knowledge, professional experience, and qualifications of personnel gradually lost their significance in comparison to Party interests. Throughout the 1930s, the increasing ideological conditioning of the personnel composition within the prosecutorial bodies—an integral component of the judicial system—led to a progressive deterioration of conditions within the system.